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• This paper provides an overview of the Programme for Financial Re-
vival announced in October 2002 in Japan. The programme aimed to
dramatically reduce the large amount of non-performing loans that
remained until the end of the 1990s. In addition to solving the pro-
blem of bad loans, the Programme for Financial Revival aimed to
build a strong financial system. For this purpose, the programme
comprised three pillars: 1) creation of a new framework for the fi-
nancial system, 2) creation of a new framework for corporate revi-
talisation, and 3) creation of a new framework for financial
administration. The Japanese experience suggests that despite its
delayed introduction, this programme may be considered suc-
cessful in going some way to drastically reduce non-performing
loans and stabilise the financial system. Japan’s financial problems
and their resolution since the 1990s provide a number of lessons for
other economies, particularly for Europe in relation to the difficul-
ties over the euro.  
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1 Introduction
The Japanese economy, which began to deteriorate after the collapse of the economic bubble 
in the early 1990s, has been stagnant throughout the decade. Though various reasons exist for the  
prolonged stagnation, the most fundamental problem involved a delay in the disposal of bad loans. The 
build-up of  bad loans began to have a negative effect  on banks,  which was particularly  striking in  
leading financial institutions.
Formed in September 2002, the Koizumi Cabinet prioritised the disposal of these bad loans.  
Hakuo  Yanagisawa,  the  Financial  Affairs  Minister,  was  dismissed  because  the  Financial  Services 
Agency made no progress in solving the bad-loans problem under his supervision. As part of the first  
cabinet  reshuffle,  he  was  replaced  by  Heizo  Takenaka,  who  also  held  the  position  of  Minister  for  
Economic  and  Fiscal  Policy.  On  30  October  2002,  the  government  announced  the  Programme  for 
Financial  Revival,  one  pillar  of  the  emergency  economic  measures  in  response  to  deflation.  This 
programme served as an important feature of the financial administration until the end of 2004. The 
following  sections  provides  an  overview  of  this  programme  and  a  broad  picture  of  the  decisive  
measures used to stabilise Japan’s financial system.
　　　　Table 1 on the next page summarises the chronology of the programme to stabilise Japan’s 
financial system from 1994 to 2006. 
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Table 1: Programme to stabilise Japan’s financial system, 1994–2006
Year  Month Event
1994 12 Bankruptcy of Tokyo Kyowa Credit Union and Anzen Credit Union
Establishment of Tokyo Kyodo Bank as an aid agency
1995 8 Bankruptcy of Cosmo Credit Union and Kizu Credit Union
8 Bankruptcy of Hyogo Bank 
Establishment of Midori Bank as a receiver
12 Public funds (685 billion yen) infused into seven housing companies
1996 6 Payoffs frozen (all deposits guaranteed)
9 Tokyo Kyodo Bank reorganises as the Resolution and Collection Bank.
11 Bankruptcy of Hanwa Bank
1997 10 Merger of Fukutoku Bank and Naniwa Bank into Namihaya Bank
11 Bankruptcy of Hokkaido Takushoku Bank
Voluntary closure of Yamaichi Securities
1998 3 Recapitalisation based on the former Stabilisation Act (21 banks for a total of 
1.8156 trillion yen)
6 Creation of the Financial Supervisory Agency
10 Enactment of Financial Revitalisation Act (to process bankruptcies)
Enactment of Early Financial Correction Law (for recapitalisation using public 
funds)
Temporary nationalisation of Long-Term Credit Bank
12 Temporary nationalisation of Nippon Credit Bank
1999 3 Leading 15 banks recapitalised using public funds (7.4593 trillion yen)
4 Creation of the Resolution and Collection Corporation (RCC)
5 Bankruptcy of Kokumin Bank and Kokufuku Bank
6 Bankruptcy of Tokyo Kyowa Bank
8 Bankruptcy of Namihaya Bank
10 Bankruptcy of Niigata Chuo Bank
2000 7 Creation of the Financial Services Agency
2001 4 Enactment of the Deposit Insurance Acts
6 Basic plan for rapid disposal of bad loans proposed by Koizumi cabinet
12 Bankruptcy of Ishikawa Bank and Chubu Bank
2002 1 Establishment of Bank Equity Purchasing Corporation
3 National percentage of bad loans reaches its highest point at 8.9%
4 Partial lifting of ban on payoffs
10 Commencement of Programme for Financial Revival
2003 3 Action Programme concerning enhancement of Relationship Banking 
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Functions
6 Infusion of public funds (1.96 trillion yen) into Resona Bank
9 Infusion of public funds (6 billion yen) into Kanto Tsukuba Bank
11 Temporary nationalisation of Ashikaga Bank
2004 8 Enactment of Act on Special Measures for Strengthening Financial Functions
2005 4 Lifting of the ban on payoffs
(upper limit of deposit insurance raised to 10 million yen) 
2006 11 Infusion of public funds (31.5 billion yen) into Kiyo Holdings
12 Infusion of public funds (9 billion yen) into Towa Bank
The  remainder  of  this  paper  is  structured  as  follows.  Section  2  introduces  the  framework  of  the 
Programme for Financial Revival. Section 3 provides an overview of the implementation of stricter asset  
assessments. Section 4 summarises a reconsideration of tax effect accounting. Section 5 considers  
strengthening governance in financial institutions. Section 6 reviews a new framework for corporate 
revitalisation. Section 7 summarises the lessons from the revitalisation of Japan’s financial system. 
Section 8 concludes. 
2 Framework of the Programme for Financial Revival
In addition to solving the problem of bad loans, the Programme for Financial Revival aimed to  
build  a  strong  financial  system.  For  this  purpose,  the  programme  incorporated  the  following three 
pillars (the framework is summarised in Figure 1).
The first pillar involved the creation of a new framework for the financial system. In particular,  
measures had to be adopted to help small- and medium-sized companies that would face difficulties  
obtaining  loans  given  the  disposal  of  bad  loans.  Moreover,  a  new  public  fund  system  had  to  be  
established. The second pillar concerned the creation of a new framework for corporate revitalisation—
specifically the creation of a marketplace for loan claims), the establishment of the Resolution and 
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Figure 1 Program for Financial Revival 
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Collection Corporation (RCC) and the strengthening of the RCC’s corporate revitalisation function. The  
third  pillar  entailed  the  creation  of  a  new  framework  for  financial  administration—specifically  the 
implementation  of  stricter  asset  assessments,  efforts  towards  capital  adequacy  and  improved 
governance.  On  the  basis  of  these  three  pillars,  the  government  prepared  a  policy  menu  of  
approximately  40  items  and,  in  November  2002,  developed  a  work  schedule  to  implement  this  
programme. This schedule detailed the planned implementation timeline of each item (a total of 40 
items) derived from the three pillars.
3 Implementation of stricter asset assessment
3.1 Continuation and publication of special assessments
The  implementation  of  special  assessments  began  in  2001,  even  before  the  start  of  the 
Programme for  Financial  Revival.  However,  in  September 2001,  the large supermarket  chain Mycal  
declared bankruptcy, and people began to notice the lax self-assessments conducted by banks. At the  
time, Mycal was classified as a company with ‘some concerns for the future’ but with little chance of  
becoming insolvent. The Financial Services Agency reintroduced self-assessments in the accounting 
period ending March 2003 (the close of the fiscal year) as a means towards stricter self-assessments.  
These  assessments  were  conducted  four  times  until  the  end  of  the  six-month  period  through 
September 2004.
3.2 A new method of asset assessment: implementation of the DCF Method
Banks regularly conducted self-assessments of the value of their loans and other assets and 
classified these assets as a means of correctly evaluating which receivables had a low probability of  
repayment. In the self-assessments conducted by banks, borrowers were divided into the following 
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five  categories  on  the  basis  of  their  financial  circumstances.  In  order  of  financial  stability,  the  
categories were ‘normal’, ‘some concerns for the future’, ‘non-performing and probably irrecoverable’,  
‘nearly  uncollectible’  and  ‘uncollectible’.  Moreover,  the  receivables  held  by  the  banks  were  further  
divided into ‘unclassifiable’, ‘Class II’, ‘Class III’ and ‘Class IV’ for each of the above borrower categories.
Before these classifications,  banks processed loans in  the ‘normal’,  ‘some concerns for  the  
future’  and  ‘non-performing  and  probably  irrecoverable’  categories  according  to  the  Financial  
Inspection  Manual.  They  forecast  the  amount  of  losses  by  multiplying  the  debt  amount  by  a  
prospective loss rate based on past loan loss ratios and default probabilities. These loans were then 
recorded in the books as allowances for doubtful accounts at the amount of the forecast loss. In other  
words, the traditional method of assessing reserve funds was based on a backward-looking calculation  
that relied on past performance.
In contrast, under the Programme for Financial Revival, a new method known as the discounted 
cash flow (DCF) method was adopted, along with the existing method, to assess the allowance for  
doubtful accounts. This method accounted for the difference between the book value of loans and the  
discounted  present  value  of  future  cash  flows  for  the  original  loan  receivables  and  interest  as 
allowances for doubtful accounts. Next, we examine, in the following order, 1) the loans to which the 
DCF  method  was  applied,  2)  some  points  to  consider  when  using  the  DCF  method  and  3)  the  
relationship between applying the DCF method and processing bad loans.
1) Loans to which the DCF Method was applied
The Financial Inspection Manual has been revised as follows with regard to the DCF method.  
First, using the DCF method is ideal in cases of large borrowers (those with credit more than 10 billion  
yen) classified as ‘requiring supervision’. However, if calculating future cash flows is difficult, using a 
method to calculate, on an individual basis, the amount of time remaining until the loan is repaid is 
preferable. Second, using the DCF method is ideal in cases of loans ‘feared to be uncollectible’.
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2) Points to consider when applying the DCF Method
The  following  four  points  must  be  considered  when  applying  the  DCF  method.  First,  when  
estimating future cash flows, available internal data (loan loss ratio rating categories consistent with 
obligator categories, bankruptcy probability, rating transition analysis, etc.) must be used to the fullest  
extent to provide an objective and rational forecast. Second, the contracted interest rate or effective  
interest  rate  at  the  time  of  loan  creation  must  be  used  as  a  discount  rate  when  calculating  the 
discounted present value. Third, based on the DCF method, the amount of the allowances for doubtful  
accounts in the books must sufficiently reflect the amount of credit risk of the borrower. When one  
considers the adoption of the DCF method in the context of the effort to make self-assessments stricter  
in conjunction with bad-loans processing, the amount of allowances for doubtful accounts calculated  
using the DCF method might be larger than that calculated using the traditional method.
3) Disposal of bad loans using the DCF Method
The Financial Services Agency requested the Japanese Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
to consider using the DCF method. The Institute announced the ‘Proposed Revisions to the Financial  
Inspection Manual for Implementation of the DCF Method’ on 25 February 2003 and began enforcing  
these changes starting with the financial year through March 2003.
The DCF method was first  proposed in the U.S.,  and it was feared that the Japanese lending 
market  might  find  it  unsuitable.  For  example,  in  Japan,  lenders  do  not  focus  on  the  cash  flow  of  
individual operations to which a loan is applied. Rather, lending is provided to the company as a whole.  
In  addition,  Japanese  banks  have  been  providing  real  estate  mortgages  for  many  years  and  are  
unfamiliar with lending based on a business project’s future cash flows. However, the collapse of the 
bubble and subsequent delays in the disposal of bad loans prompted bold changes within Japanese 
financial  institutions.  In  this  context,  using  the  asset  assessment  method  known  as  DCF  was 
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considered a critical foundation for reforming Japan’s financial system. Using the DCF method, major  
Japanese banks increased their rate of provision against loans by 20 to 30 percentage points from the  
previous 20 percent.
3.3 Correcting inconsistencies in borrower classifications
Inconsistencies in borrower classifications among banks were corrected as part of an effort to  
strengthen asset assessments under the Programme for Financial Revival. Specifically, variations that 
occurred in borrower classifications among banks were made uniform. The similar programme in the 
U.S. is called the Shared National Credit Programme and is a standard by which main banks determine  
borrower classifications. However, in Japan, leading banks’ assessments were generally considered  
too soft, and fundamental reforms were implemented under the revitalisation programme. A decision  
was made that beginning in the fiscal year through March 2003, independent real estate companies 
rather  than  those  affiliated  with  banks  would  be  used  for  appraisals  to  conduct  stricter  collateral 
valuations.  A reform proposal  entitled ‘Strict  Verification of  Collateral  Valuations’  was announced in 
March 2003.
Japan followed the practice of one-year and three-year standards regarding the period used to  
calculate allowances for doubtful accounts. ‘Normal’ loans or other loans with ‘some concerns for the 
future’ were viewed as losses after a year; loans requiring supervision were counted as losses after  
three years and recorded in the books as reserve funds. The Programme for Financial Revival reviewed 
these practices again. For loans requiring supervision, both the previously discussed DCF method and  
the three-year standard were used together in revisions to reserve fund accounting.
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4 Reconsideration of tax effect accounting
4.1 Deferred tax assets and equity capital
Though certain items may be processed as expenses in corporate accounting,  these items 
may not be immediately allowed as deductible expenses under tax law, which may lead to a larger tax 
burden as taxable income increases. Tax effect accounting is a framework for coordinating differences  
between how items are treated in accounting and under tax law. In tax effect accounting, overpayment  
of taxes is assumed to be refunded in the future. The amount of overpayment is booked under the  
assets section of the balance sheet in corporate accounting. These assets are known as ‘deferred tax 
assets’. Allowances for doubtful accounts are viewed as expenses in accounting though they are not 
counted as deductible expenses under tax law. Increasing allowances for doubtful accounts signifies  
greater deferred tax assets.
Deferred tax assets have the following two unique characteristics. First, in deferred tax asset  
accounting, future taxes are reduced by the amount of deferred tax assets, indicating that the assets 
are  not  available  unless  the  company  increases  future  earnings  and  starts  paying  taxes.  Put  
differently, the company must project strong future earnings to set aside a large amount of deferred tax  
assets. Second, deferred tax assets are recorded as assets, indicating that an increase in deferred tax 
assets leads to an increase in the company’s capital.  These two points create a situation in which  
companies that overestimate their  future earnings set aside a large amount of deferred tax assets,  
which in turn leads to overvalued equity capital.
For example, UFJ HD posted a loss exceeding 1 trillion yen in 2001. However, the company 
forecasted a profit of 120 billion yen in fiscal 2002 and 330 billion yen in fiscal 2003. Deferred tax 
assets ballooned given this optimistic projection, resulting in an expansion of equity capital. Table 2 
provides a summary of the equity capital/deferred tax asset ratio of the four largest banks and shows  
that three banks—other than Mitsubishi Tokyo Group—had a degree of dependence stronger than 60 
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percent as of March 2003.
Table 2: Share of deferred tax assets for the owned capital (%)
Shigemi (2005).
4.2 Reconsideration of deferred tax assets
As previously summarised, accounting for deferred tax assets results in a natural increase in  
equity capital, though determining the quality of this type of capital is difficult. Therefore, a panel was 
formed to discuss the quality of equity capital in the Programme for Financial Revival, and wide-ranging 
discussions ensued. These arguments were summarised in July 2003, and a report was submitted in  
June  2004.  In  October  2005,  the  Financial  Services  Agency  began  requesting  the  disclosure  of  
deferred tax asset information from leading banks, and inspections became stricter thereafter.
Along with this reconsideration of deferred tax assets, Resona Bank was nationalised in 2003  
and is a subject of a case study in this paper. Resona Bank, the result of a merger between Daiwa Bank  
and Asahi Bank, became a leading bank with total assets exceeding 30 trillion yen. At the time, Resona  
Bank recorded enormous deferred tax assets, which supplemented its equity capital. The company’s  
balance sheet for March 2003, shown in Table 3, indicates that deferred tax assets for that period were  
approximately 400 billion yen—larger than the shareholder equity of 366 billion yen.
2002.3 2003.3 2004.9 2003.9 2004.3
Mizuho 48.6 62.7 27.6 41.9 31.8
Mitsui Sumitomo 54.5 88.0 59.2 65.5 55.4
UFJ 56.8 89.9 66.4 62.5 73.5
Mitsubishi Tokyo 32.1 47.4 19.4 30.0 17.4
11
Table 3: Consolidated Balance sheet in Resona Bank (2003 March) (100 million yen)
Assets Liabilities
Cash and due from banks                   17,030
Trading assets                                     5,110
Securities                                            51,140
Loans and bills discounted                 214,440
Tangible and intangible fixed assets   6,460
Deferred tax assets                             4010
Allowance for loan losses                   -6660
Other assets                                      13,370
Total assets                                        304,900
Deposit                               223,540                
NCD                                   4,140
Financial market liabilities  53,150
Other liabilities                   20,410
Share capital                      3,660
Total liabilities and capital   304,900
Fukao (2009).
Under these circumstances, Resona Bank’s audit firm, which limited deferred tax assets to three 
years, discovered that the bank’s capital adequacy ratio was 2%—below the 4% minimum set by the  
Bank for International Settlements. Therefore, Resona Bank fell under the Deposit Insurance Act of May  
2003 and received an infusion of public funds of 1.96 trillion yen, which effectively nationalised the  
bank.
5 Strengthening governance in financial institutions
The following three policies were incorporated to strengthen banks’ corporate governance as part  
of the Programme for Financial Revival.
5.1 Reinforcement of accounting audits
First, policies to reinforce accounting audits were confirmed. In particular, on 17 December  
2002,  shortly  after  the  revitalisation  programme  was  announced,  the  Financial  Services  Agency  
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announced the ‘Financial Services Agency Position on the Certified Public Accountant Audit System’.  
Specific topics addressed in the paper included 1) clarification of the mission and role of CPAs, 2)  
reinforcement  of  the  independence  of  CPAs  and  others  and  3)  reinforcement  of  monitoring  and  
oversight  by  auditing  firms.  On  24  February  2003,  the  Japanese  Institute  of  Certified  Public  
Accountants announced policies regarding strict  responses by auditors to audits of  leading banks.  
These policies specifically addressed tighter accounting for deferred tax assets as well as stricter self-
asset assessments,  allowances and amortisations.  Asset assessments often required complex and 
advanced knowledge of accounting, and banks frequently relied on CPAs in practice. 
Accordingly, that both financial agencies and CPAs alike took a step back to review the state of  
the situation to date and present new policies is significant.
5.2 Stricter use of prompt corrective action
As of April  1998, the Financial  Services Agency decided to impose a business improvement 
order for ‘prompt corrective action’ on financial institutions with equity capital ratios that were below  
set standards. These prompt corrective actions were intended to pre-empt bankruptcies of financial  
institutions  and  maintain  the  viability  of  management.  Directly  after  the  announcement  of  the  
Programme for Financial  Revival,  on 10 December 2002, the Financial  Services Agency announced 
stricter use of these prompt corrective actions and revised business guidelines on the basis of the  
Banking Act.  These revisions shortened the period from three years to one year, during which time  
financial  institutions that  received a prompt corrective action order  were required to  improve their  
capital adequacy ratio.
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5.3 Strengthened governance for recapitalisation
On  4  April  2003,  the  Financial  Services  Agency  announced  polices  for  the  reinforcement  of  
governance in recapitalisations using public funds. These policies were guidelines for banks that were  
forced to recapitalise using an infusion of public funds. They addressed measures for banks that failed  
to improve their finances in the following fiscal year.
Specifically, the policies were business improvement orders calling for bold restructuring efforts  
such as the resignation of the top management, a review of compensation structures and a reduction in 
employee headcount when after-tax profits declined to below 30% (known as the ‘30% rule’). If banks  
were  unable  to  improve  profitability  after  receiving  another  business  improvement  order,  then  
conversion rights were exercised to convert preferred shares into common shares. Several examples  
exist, such as the case of Kumamoto Family Bank, which received a business improvement order in  
July  2004  to  change  its  president.  In  addition,  the  Financial  Services  Agency  issued  a  business  
improvement order to UFJ Holdings and UFJ Bank on 18 June 2004 because the banks concealed 
documents concerning their borrowers.
6 A new framework for corporate revitalisation
We have comprehensively reviewed the first pillar—a new framework for the financial system—
and the third pillar—the creation of a new financial administration framework—within the Programme 
for Financial Revival. The second pillar presented a menu of bank reforms for processing bad loans. This 
comprehensive  processing of  bad  loans  necessarily  resulted  from  the  restructuring and  culling  of 
companies that carried excessive debt and that were inextricably tied to bad loans. We now consider in  
detail this second pillar—the creation of a new framework for corporate revitalisation—that proposed  
solutions to these issues. 
Measures for corporate revitalisation included the use and reinforcement of the Resolution and 
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Collection Corporation (RCC). The RCC was established in 1996, and its function was strengthened by 
the programme for  Financial  Revival  as  follows:  1)  managing and collecting loans purchased from  
bankrupt housing loan companies and 2) purchasing, managing and collecting loans from bankrupt  
financial  institutions  entrusted  by  the  Deposit  Insurance  Corporation  of  Japan  and  assigning 
responsibility of the civil and criminal code for executives and banks involved in bankruptcies. Further,  
the  Financial  Services  Agency  promoted  the  use  of  RCC  for  corporate  revitalisation  of  small-  and  
medium-sized  businesses  as  part  of  the  2003  Action  Programme  concerning  enhancement  of 
Relationship Banking Functions.
6.1 Resolution and Collection Corporation
RCC measures included policies involving the purchase of loans of bankrupt financial institutions  
and  indirectly  dealing  with  heavily  indebted  companies.  In  contrast,  the  Industrial  Revitalisation  
Corporation of Japan (IRCJ) was established in April 2003 to directly support business revitalisation for  
such companies. This corporation was created on the basis of the Securum model established in 1992.  
IRCJ remained in existence for only four years until June 2007 but logged 41 instances of providing  
support.  Next,  we  summarise  1)  the  characteristics  of  support  from  the  ICRJ  and  2)  the  support  
procedures (the summary provides current details as of 2009).
1) Characteristics of ICRJ Support
Though 41 instances of ICRJ support existed, the amount of debt at the time of this support was  
enormous and totalled approximately 4.02 trillion yen. Total bad loans held by all financial institutions 
as of the end of March 2003 equalled 35 trillion yen, and as of 2009, the RCC was noted as supporting 
approximately 10% of the total bad loans in Japan.
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Figure 2 indicates the share of bad loans by industry. The manufacturing industry accounts for 
approximately 22% of such loans. The remainder concern non-manufacturing industries; of these, the 
highest shares are held by hotels and inns at 28% and wholesale and retail at 27%. These industries  
received  excess  funding  given  soaring  land  prices  during  the  bubble  period,  which  led  to  over-
investment.
Figure 2: Companies the IRCJ decided to assist, share by sector
Okina (2009).
Next, we review the breakdown of banks that received revitalisation support. Figure 3 shows the 
share of each bank’s total loans at the time they received support and indicates that more than 95% 
were mega banks. Therefore, borrowers of these mega-banks likely caused bad loans to balloon until  
business revitalisation support became necessary.
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Figure 3: The share by submitting bank on behalf of the companies the IRCJ decided to assist 
Okina(2009).
2) ICRJ Support Procedures
Procedures taken by the ICRJ in providing corporate revitalisation support  followed four steps. 
First, the primary borrower and companies requiring revitalisation created a draft revitalisation plan and 
requested support from the ICRJ. Second, the ICRJ determined the propriety of support, consulted with  
institutions other than the lender banks in question and reached an agreement. Third, considering that 
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agreement,  the  ICRJ  created  a  detailed  plan  for  purchasing  the  debt.  After  completion  of  the  
revitalisation plan, the ICRJ checked whether financial support or business restructuring had occurred  
according to plan. Fourth, the ICRJ had to decide whether to dispose of the debt within three years of 
purchase.
7 Lessons from the revitalisation of Japan’s financial system
This overview presented the measures undertaken to revitalise Japan’s financial system from the  
1990s onward. The following lessons emerge from Japan’s experience in dealing with economic crises 
(this explanation is based on Iwata and Yoshikawa (2008) and Sakuragawa (2006)).
1) Bad loan assessment and disclosure
Lesson 1
Regarding bad loans, procedures are critical for rapid assessments based on strict guidelines 
and the disclosure of accurate information.
After the collapse of Japan’s economic bubble in 1992, banks did not realise the true state of bad loans, 
and more than 10 years passed before these loans were written off. This problem concerns not only 
self-assessment on the part of individual financial institutions but also how financial regulators should  
best approach bad loans (regarding, e.g., definition and scope). According to Hoggarth et al. (2002), the 
average duration of global financial crises from the 1980s onward (47 total crises) was 3.7 years. In  
Japan, this duration stretched to 14 years, from the time the bubble collapsed in 1992 to when the  
Financial Services Agency’s target of halving the amount of bad debt was finally achieved in 2005. The 
disposal of bad loans took far too long and delayed the rebuilding of Japan’s financial system, thus  
creating what is now known as the ‘lost decade’.
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Lesson 2
The purchase of bad loans through a purchasing organisation must be done in a highly 
transparent fashion to gain taxpayers’ understanding.
The disclosed bad loans needed to be quickly sold in the market or through a purchasing organisation.  
In the case of Japan, strict assessments by the Financial Services Agency facilitated the assessment of 
bad loans and calculation of the required capital infusion using the same standards for all  financial  
institutions that had to write off bad loans.
2) Capital Infusion
Lesson 3
When  infusing  capital  using  public  funds,  fully  investigating and  publicly  disclosing the 
financial  situation of  the financial  institution  into which capital  will  be infused is  critical  to 
gaining taxpayers’ understanding.
In  1996,  approximately  650  billion  yen  of  public  funds  were  infused  into  Japanese  housing loan  
companies to dispose of housing loans. Many lawmakers opposed this move, and enacting the bill to  
infuse public funds faced numerous complications. These complications is considered to have delayed  
the subsequent use of public funds, which did not happen in earnest until the Program for Financial  
Revival began to provide direction in 2003. Thus, infusion of public funds must be handled with great 
care and strong agreement along with a concrete programme for the disposal of bad loans.
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Lesson 4
When infusing capital into financial institutions that may go bankrupt, the possibility of a credit  
crunch must be careful considered.
The Act on Special Measures for Strengthening Financial Functions was passed in June 2004 as part of  
the Program for Financial Revival.  On this basis of this law, public funds were infused into financial  
institutions facing dire financial situations in an effort to bring them back to health. However, these  
efforts were unsuccessful in improving operations, and many financial institutions struggled with the 
strong possibility of having to reduce credit to small- and medium-sized businesses. Only two financial  
institutions actually used the system, which was later modified to enable banks’ continued lending to  
small- and medium-sized businesses after receiving public funds.
Lesson 5
A financial system must be rebuilt with a view to facilitating mergers among local financial 
institutions and not just among leading financial institutions.
Bad loans were drastically reduced through the Program for Financial Revival . The financial institutions 
known  throughout  the  1970s  and  1980s  as  the  ‘20  leading  banks’  subsequently  merged  or  
disappeared. Consequently, in 2004, the number of major banks was reduced to four. Such drastic  
restructuring among the largest banks did not occur among local financial institutions. Therefore, these  
smaller banks continue to struggle with excessive competition and are protected from the perspective  
of deposit insurance or a safety net mechanism. However, overprotection could encourage them to 
increase inefficient lending.
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8 Conclusion
This  paper  overviews  the  outline  and  characteristics  of  the  Programme  for  Financial  Revival  
announced  in  October  2002  in  Japan.  An  outstanding  characteristic  of  the  programme  is  that 
inadequate assessment of assets and disclosure of information were tightened, and transparency of  
bank  management  was  improved.  The  disposal  of  non-performing  loans  was  accelerated,  and 
functional enhancement of  financial institutions’ supervisory and regulatory regime was significantly 
advanced.  The Japanese economy, which began to deteriorate after the collapse of the bubble in the  
early  1990s,  stagnated  throughout  the  decade.  Policy  makers  shelved  the  issue  for  ten  years; 
therefore,  the  introduction  of  the  programme  was  nothing  short  of  being  too  late.  The  market 
mechanism is not  necessarily  perfect:  It  is  historically  difficult  to  control  and frequently  causes a 
financial crisis. Depending solely on the market mechanism is nearly impossible, and drastic and quick 
public intervention is occasionally inevitable. Japan’s financial  problems and their resolution in the  
1990s  provide  numerous  lessons  for  many  countries,  particularly  for  Europe  in  relation  to  the  
confusion over the euro.
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